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OBIORA E. EGBUNA v. TIME-LIFE LIBRARIES, INCORPORATED
95 E3d 353 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
OPINION VACATED AND REHEARING
EN BANC GRANTED
The Fourth Circuit vacated its opinion in Egbuna
and granted a rehearing before the full panel of
judges.' The purpose behind examining the vacated
Fourth Circuit opinion is to alert the reader to the
forthcoming en banc opinion and the factors that
the court is likely to consider for the resolution of
this controversy. The vacated opinion is important
because it enunciated rarely examined principles that
will affect resident aliens who do not have green
cards. In fact, the en banc court will find no case law
beyond that noted in the vacated Egbuna opinion
and in the discussion below. Only the District Court
for the Eastern District of California 2 and the Eleventh Circuit? have approached the question of
whether aliens can bring employment discrimination suits. The vacated Fourth Circuit opinion is the
most recent in this short series of opinions on this
subject matter, and it is likely to play a significant
role in the ultimate en banc opinion.
I.

FACTS

Obiora Egbuna, appellant, was employed by
Time-Life Libraries (hereinafter "ILLI"), appellee,
from June 1989 until April 1993. Egbuna was a
Nigerian national who, when TLLI initially hired
him, had authorization from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to work in the United States.
During Egbuna's employment with TLLI, an employee whom Egbuna supervised, Harrison Jackson,
reported to Egbuna that another employee had sexually harassed him.An internal investigation followed,
and Egbuna corroborated some of Jackson's allegations. Egbuna resigned voluntarily from TLLI in April
1993, but then sought reemployment in June 1993.
' Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries,Inc-, 95 F.3d 353 (4th

Ci. 1996).Arguments were heard on March 4, 1997, and
a decision by the Fourth Circuit is pending
2

EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585

(E.D.3 Cal. 1991).

Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1 th Cir.

1988).

442 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) makes it illegal for employers to discriminate because an applicant "has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

Egbuna's authorization to work in the United
States expired before his voluntary resignation from
his prior employment with TLLI. TLLI offered to
rehire Egbuna but ultimately withdrew the offer,
stating that he had failed to follow company policy
while reporting the sexual harassment complaints
of Jackson. Egbuna sued TLLI, alleging that the company had not rehired him because of his participation in the enforcement proceedings involving
Jackson's complaints, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
4
(1988).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment
for TLLI on the ground that Egbuna was an alien
without work authorization. 5 In order to reach
Egbuna's discrimination claim, the district court required Egbuna to prove that he was qualified for
the position he sought with TLLI. Egbuna did not
have employment authorization at the time of reapplication. Therefore, the court found that Egbuna
was not qualified for the position with TLLI, and
Egbuna appealed. 6 The case was one of first impression for the Fourth Circuit. The question before the
court was whether an undocumented alien who was
ineligible to work in the United States under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19867 could
bring a Title VII action for refusal to hire.
II. HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit held that status as an alien without
authorization to work in the United States did not
disqualify the appellant from establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination by his employer under
Title VII.8 The court held, instead, that the parties
should apply the proof scheme set forth in
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
IEgbuna, 95 F.3d at 354.
695 F.3d at 354.
7
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(a)(1) (Supp. 1996), makes it unlawful to8 grant employment to an unauthorized alien.
Egbuna, 95 F.3d at 357.

McDonnell Douglas Corp.v. Green9 for proving employment discrimination. Because the court found
that work eligibility was not part of a prima facie
case of discrimination, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the
case to the district court.
III. ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
The appeal involved two federal statutes, Title
VII and the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA). IRCA makes knowingly employing an unauthorized alien illegal.' 0 Egbuna, claiming retaliatory failure to employ, sued TLLI under
Title VII, which prohibits discrimination against an
employment applicant "because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
'
subchapter.""
A. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
The Fourth Circuit held that the proof scheme
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
applies to retaliatory claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3, as well as to discriminatory claims.' 2
Under McDonnell Douglas the employee must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing
three elements: "1) the employee engaged in protected activity; 2) the employer took adverse employment action against the employee; and 3) a
causal connection existed between the protected

9McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). A civil rights activist engaged in illegal activity
against his employer in an effort to protest that his discharge as an employee and the general hiring practices of
the firm were racially motivated. Id. at 794. The court
held that in a Title VII trial, the complainant carries the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802.The court noted that because facts
vary in Title VII cases, the prima fade proof required from
each respondent would differ according to factual situations. Id.
'08 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (Supp. 1996).
1"42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
12 Ross v. CommunicationsSatellite Corp., 759 E2d 355,
365 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Williams v. Boorstin, 663
F.2d 109, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Womack v. Munson, 619
F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980).
" Ross, 759 F.2d at 365. The Ross court determined
that the employee must show that the adverse action was
the "but-for" cause of the action being challenged in the

activity and the adverse action." 3 Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the employee has a presumption of retaliation. The employer may rebut that presumption by providing a
nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action. 4 The
employer need not prove the absence of a retaliatory motive; it must, however, raise a genuine issue
of fact as to whether retaliation occurred for the
protected activity. s If the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, the burden of
proof shifts back to the employee, who must show
that the reason
advanced by the employer is
6
pretextual.'
In Egbuna, TLLI conceded that Egbuna participated in protected activity during his employment
and that TLLI did not rehire Egbuna.17 Therefore

Egbuna had established the first two requirements
necessary for a prima facie case. TLLI asserted that,
at the summary judgment stage, the only issue was
"whether Egbuna, who could not have been hired
by TLLI, [could] demonstrate a causal connection
between the protected activity and TLLI's failure
to employ him." 8 Egbuna argued that he satisfied
the three elements necessary to establish a prima
facie case by alleging that TLLI failed to rehire him
solely because of his witness status.' 9
B. CASE PRECEDENT
The specific question before the Fourth Circuit
was addressed by the United States District Court
of California in the case of EEOC v. Tortilleria"La
Mejor" 20 That court held that Title VII protects
unauthorized aliens despite the IRCA provisions.21
retaliation context. Id. at 366. However, the Egbuna court
noted that Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act

of 1991 to provide that a statutory violation occurs if "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) (Supp. III 1991). This court explained that the Civil
Rights Act does not address illegal employment practices
specifically as defined by § 2000e-3 (a), the statute under
which4 Egbuna sought recovery. Egbuna, 95 F.3d at 355.
1 Ross, 759 F.2d at 365.
15
759 F.2d at 365.
'6ld.
17 Egbuna, 95 F.3d at 355.
1895 F.3d at 355.
19 Id.
20
EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F Supp. 585
(E.D. Cal. 1991).
*Tortilleria, 758 F. Supp. at 593-94.

In Tortilleria, an employee who was an undocumented alien filed a claim of sex discrimination underTitle VII. 2 The California district court held that
undocumented aliens were protected underTitle VII
and noted that the EEOC had always so construed
the statute.23 The court then examined whether the
enactment of the IRCA 24 altered the scope of the
projections of Title VII and concluded that "Congress did not intend that the IRCA amend or repeal
any of the previously legislated projections of the
federal labor and employment laws accorded to
aliens, documented or undocumented, including the
projections of Title VII."25
In Patelv. Quality Inn South,26 the Eleventh Circuit considered the interplay of the IRCA and the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress enacted the
FLSA to eliminate substandard conditions in the
work place. 27 The court held that in regard to un-documented aliens, the IRCA did not affect the
FLSA's application; its construction was based, in
part, on the principle that courts disfavor "amendments by implication."28 Only when the intent of
Congress to amend or repeal is clear will courts conclude that a previous act is implicitly repealed or

amended by a later one 9 The Patel court concluded

that nothing in the IRCA or the IRCA's legislative
history suggested that Congress intended the FLSA
to limit the rights of undocumented aliens and that
the coverage of undocumented aliens under the
FLSA was fully consistent with the IRCA.30 The
court found that a policy conflict did not arise from
the simultaneous application of both the FLSA and
the IRCA:
Congress enacted the IRCA to reduce illegal
immigration by eliminating employers' economic incentive to hire undocumented aliens.
To achieve this objective the IRCA imposes an
escalating series of sanctions on employers who
hire such workers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a." The
FLSA's coverage of undocumented workers has
a similar effect in that it offsets what is perhaps
the most attractive feature of such workerstheir willingness to work for less than the minimum wage. If the FLSA did not cover undocumented aliens, employers would have an incentive to hire them. Employers might find it economically advantageous to hire and underpay
undocumented workers and run the risk ofsanctions under the IRCA.3

2

undocumented aliens are not expressly exempted, they

3

plainly fall within the broad definition of"employee." SureTan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984).
15 TortiUeria,758 E Supp. at 594.
26Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11 th
Cir.
1988).

758 F. Supp. at 586.
Id. at 589. The court noted that if Congress' intent
is dear, the court must give effect to the expressed intent
of Congress. However, if the plain meaning of Title VII is
unclear, the court may look at the EEOC's interpretation
of it. Id. The EEOC's Compliance Manual states: "[T]he
acceptance or rejection of a Title VII charge should not
hinge upon the potential charging party's status as a documented or undocumented alien. It is the Commission's
position that the term 'any individual' in § 703 of theAct
includes any person, whether documented or not, within
the jurisdictional boundaries of any 'State." EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH), 3806 at 3810-11 (1982). Since
the enactment of the IRCA, the EEOC has reaffirmed its
position on the matter. EEOC Compliance Manual
(CCH), 3820 at 3813 (1987). Although the EEOC's interpretation of Title VI's scope is not controlling, it is
entitled to "great deference." Tortilleria, 758 F. Supp. at
589. The California district court concluded that the plain
meaning of Title VII supported the moving parties and
that the EEOC's consistent position reinforced this conclusion. 758 F. Supp. at 589.
14 Before the IRCA was enacted, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that aliens were protected against discrimination under Title VII. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 95 (1973). The Supreme Court had also held
that undocumented aliens were considered "employees"
under the National Labor Relations Act, meaning any
workers not specifically exempted from the act. Because
2

27 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1938). The FLSA requires cov-

ered employers to pay a statutorily prescribed minimum
wage to their employees, 29 U.S.C. § 202, and prohibits
employers from requiring their employees to work in ex-

cess of forty hours per week without compensating them
at one and one half times their regular hourly rate. 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Congress defined the term "employee"
in order to determine whom the act would cover. "Employee" was defined to include "any individual employed
by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). Congress listed
specific exceptions to this expansive definition.This framework strongly implies that Congress intended that the all-

encompassing definition would include all employees not
specifically excepted. Patel, 846 F.2d at 702.
zgPatel, 846 F.2d at 704.
29846
F.2d at 704.
30
1d.
318 U.S.C.A.

§ 1324(a)(2) states, "[i]t is unlawful for
a person or other entity, after hiring an alien for employment.. ., to continue to employ the alien in the United
States knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien with
respect to such employment."
3
Patel, 846 F.2d at 704.

The court recognized that the FLSA's coverage of
undocumented aliens helps discourage illegal immigration by reducing the incentive for employers to
hire such workers; thus, its objectives were consistent with the IRCA's objectives. The court therefore concluded that undocumented aliens would
33
continue to be "employees" covered by the FLSA.
C. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
Before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, TLLI argued that Egbuna lacked
work authorization, which rendered him not qualified to work, and thus Egbuna did not have the ability to make a prima facie case of retaliatory failure
to employ.34 Based on this belief,TLLI failed to ad-

vance any reply to Egbuna's Title VII claim, arguing
that it did not need to advance a motive, as the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires. Egbuna argued that the court should not allow TLLI to hide its unlawful conduct behind an
immigration law
that TLLI "knowingly violated" for
35
forty months.

The EEOC, as amicus curiae,joined Egbuna in
arguing that the trial court erred in including work
authorization in the prima fade stage. The EEOC
argued that ineligibility for employment under the
IRCA may be "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employment decision" but that it could
not be a basis for excluding a person from Title VII
projections.3 6 Ineligibility would be relevant "only if
the employer relied on that reason when making its
decision."37 Therefore, the EEOC argued, work authorization should be considered at the second stage,
and not at the prima fade case stage, if the.employer
advanced that as the nondiscriminatory reason for
its decision.3 1 Under this scheme, the plaintiff could
then attempt to show that the explanation asserted
by the employer was pretextual and that the
33846
F.2d at 705.
34Egbuna,
95 E3d at 356. The court noted that this
case was unusual because Egbuna alleged that the failure
to hire by TLLI was retaliatory. In most cases, a past relationship does not exist between the person who is not
hired and the employer, so the failure to hire is alleged to
be discriminatory,
not retaliatory. 95 E3d at 355.
3
1Id.at 356.
36
1d.
37
Id.at 357.
38
1d.
39

1d.

4Oid.
41

ld.

42
43

1d.
1d.

employer's motivation was actually discriminatory.3 9
Egbuna and the EEOC argued that, the court
should have permitted TLLI to offer Egbuna's status as an undocumented alien as the non-discriminatory reason for TLLI's action at the second stage
in the McDonnell Douglas framework. 40 Egbuna asserted that he could have then demonstrated that
TLLI's motivation was pretextual. Egbuna would
have shown that his extended employment relationship with TLLI, most of which was in violation of
the IRCA, together with the high recommendation
from TLLI's branch manager for Egbuna's reemployment, were sufficient to put in issue both whether
TLLI would have reemployed Egbuna in violation
of immigration law and whether TLLI would have
been likely to reserve the position for the appellant
41
pending his receipt of employment authorization.
D. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION
The court of appeals held that the district court's
decision endorsed a proof scheme that protected
employers from their acts of discrimination on the
basis of reasons on which they did not legitimately
rely.42 TLLI did not claim that it failed to rehire
Egbuna because he was ineligible to work. 43 Rather,
it asserted that Egbuna's status precluded it from
Title VII coverage. Inotherwords, TLLI was shielded
from Egbuna's Title VII claim because he was undocumented. 44 Furthermore, the court of appeals
found that the district court's decision which afforded this protection was directly contrary to the
Supreme Court decision of McKennon v. Nashville
Banner PublishingCo.4s In McKennon, the Court held
that when an employer fires an employee for an illegal reason, evidence of a legitimate reason for the
termination acquired after the employee has been
fired does not protect the employer from liability
under the violated statute.46 The Court noted that a
44

Id.

45

McKennon v. Nashville BannerPublishing,513 U.S.
352, 46115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 881. A discharged employee sued her employer under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1988
ed. and Supp. V). The Court held that the ADEA was
part of the wider statutory scheme of Title VII created to
protect employees nationwide. 115 S. Ct. at 884. The
Court stated that the ADEA and Title VII shared a common purpose: to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Id. The Court further stated that the object of the
ADEA and of Title VII was both deterrence and compensation for injuries resulting from the prohibited discrimination. Id.

litigant in a Title VII action, in addition to redressing a private injury, also vindicates the congressional
policy against practices of employment discrimination.4 7 The Court stated that the policy would not
have been vindicated "if after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates, in every instance, to bar all relief for
an earlier violation of the Act."48

In Egbuna, the court of appeals held that it
would not be appropriate to follow the district court
ruling and allow TLLI to escape liability for a possible violation of Title VII on the basis of Egbuna's
status as an undocumented alien. 49 The court con-

cluded that the parties should, instead, proceed
through the McDonnell Douglas framework: "TLLI
may assert Egbuna's lack of work authorization as a
legitimate non-discriminatory basis for its decision,
and Egbuna may attempt to show that the asserted
basis is pretextual."50 The court stated the policy
underlying its reasoning as follows:
We believe that the legislative effort to fight
employment discrimination by protecting those
who make or support allegations of improper
conduct is best served by holding that a Title
VII claimant need not show work authorization
as part of the prima facie case. This conclusion
does no damage to the distinct legislative decision to proscribe the hiring of undocumented
workers under the IRCA. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, uniform application of this nation's
labor laws removes a possible economic incentive to hiring illegal workers.5'
The Egbuna holding preserves an applicant's ineligibility to work as a relevant consideration. The
employer may assert lack of work authorization as
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its decision. Should a Title VII violation be established, ineligibility to work may ultimately
pertain to the
52
question of possible remedies.
IV. JUDGE RUSSELL'S DISSENT
Judge Russell criticized the majority's decision
that the parties should proceed under the McDonnell
47 Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 45 (1974)). See also InternationalBrotherhood of

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977).
481d.

49Egbuna, 95

F.3d at 357.

5095 F.3d at 357.
51Id.

Douglasframework.5 3 Judge Russell emphasized that
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employer cannot be ordered to employ an individual
unless the employee is qualified for the position
sought.5 4 An alien must have the "the requisite employment authorization" s to be qualified; here,
Egbuna "is an alien without a green card." 6 Therefore, Egbuna could not qualify for employment by
Time-Life Libraries, Inc. Judge Russell was not persuaded that mere alien status is a sufficient reason
for holding
the immigration laws subject to Title
VII. 57 Thus, Judge Russell would allow employers
to escape all liability for Title VII violations simply
because of an employee's undocumented status.
V. CONCLUSION
A rehearing en banc was granted for Egbuna.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit finding that status
as an alien lacking work authorization does not disqualify an employee from establishing a prima facie
case under Title VII was a natural product of the
decisions found in case precedent. McDonnell Douglas Corp.v. Green set forth a proof scheme for proving employment discrimination. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp. extended the proof scheme
advanced in McDonnell Douglasto retaliatory claims
brought under § 2000e-3. Based on these two decisions, the Egbuna court specified the three elements
an employee must satisfy to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. The decision of the U.S. District
Court of California in Tortilleria, which held that
Title VII extends coverage to unauthorized aliens
and that the coverage of Title VII is not altered by
the IRCA, although not entitled to controlling
weight, is important because it offers support to the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Egbuna that work eligibility is not part of a prima facie case of discrimination. The line of case law preceding Egbuna is a
progression by the courts to an acknowledgment that
undocumented aliens have rights which Title VII
protects.
The holding in Egbuna sets an important precedent by establishing two principles for claims
brought by an alien employee under Title VII. First,
an undocumented alien who is ineligible to work in
52
53

1d.

1d.
54Id. at
5 11d. at
56ld.
5,

d.

357-58.

358.

the United States under the IRCA can bring a Title
VII action for refusal to hire because status as an
alien without work authorization does not disqualify
a former employee from establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination or retaliation against an employer. Second, an employer may not escape liability for a Title VII violation on the basis of an
employee's undocumented status; thus, the parties
should proceed through the McDonnell Douglas
framework. The court acknowledged that employees who are undocumented aliens are entitled to
the same projections as other employees who have
work eligibility.58 This holding disallows employers
from using employees' lack of employment authorization as a means of escaping liability for a Title
VII violation.
Because litigants are required to proceed
through the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for any adverse action it took against an employee, and it cannot offer the undocumented status of the employee as a reason for acts of discrimination if the employer did not actually rely on that
reason. 9The employee can show that the employer's
reason is pretextual through evidence which includes
facts as to the employer's treatment of respondent
during a prior term of employment; the employer's
reaction to the employee's legitimate activities; and
the employer's general employment policy and practice. 60 Egbuna accords undocumented aliens access
to the courts of the United States by recognizing
that they are "employees" under Title VII and that
the goal of Title VII is to protect all employees' access to United States agencies and courts.
The burden on the employee to establish a prima
facie retaliation case "is not onerous."6 The prohibition Congress has placed on retaliation exists to ensure that employees "will not fear to assert their sub62
stantive rights, which are the heart of Title VII."
However, the likelihood that an undocumented alien
would bring a claim of discrimination at the risk of
being penalized administratively for an immigration

58Although the Egbuna court focused on retaliatory
claims, these principles may be applied to other claims of
discrimination or retaliation by employees who lack work
authorization.
59
Egbuna, 95 F.3d at 357.
'McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

6

U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

violation through deportation is minimal. In addition, if the undocumented employee unlawfully
entered into the United States, unlike Egbuna who
had work authorization at the time of entry, the
employee may risk greater repercussions because
unlawful entry is a criminal act. 63 The court in
Tortillerianoted that the primary reason for the lack
of case law on point was "no doubt[,] ... fear of

deportation."'
Illegal aliens come to the United States in the
hope of procuring employment. They do not come
seeking the protection of this country's labor laws.
Congress did not intend Title VII to guarantee a job,
regardless of qualification, to every person.65 Title
VII is, rather, an effort by the legislature to fight
employment discrimination. 66 The Egbuna court
acknowledges that an applicant's lack of employment authorization "remains a relevant consideration," and may be offered by the employer as the
legitimate reason for its actions.' Extending Title
VII's coverage to undocumented aliens reduces the
incentive to hire unqualified workers and discourages illegal immigration, which is consistent with
the objectives of the IRCA. The Eleventh Circuit
noted that uniformly applying the labor laws removes the economic incentive to employing illegal
workers.68
The dissent in Egbuna dismisses the policy considerations of the majority decision. Moreover, Judge
Russell fails to substantiate his opinion with case
law, and he fails to address the decision of the court
in Tortilleria,the only other court that has been presented with the specific question before the Egbuna
court. Existing case precedent establishes a progression towards protecting unauthorized aliens under
Title VII despite the provisions of the IRCA. The
majority's decision in Egbuna is supported both by
case precedent and policy and should be upheld
upon rehearing en banc by the Fourth Circuit.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Deana A. Malek

62Ross, 759 F.2d at 366.
63INA § 275 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. 1993).
Tortilleria, 758 F Supp. at 593.
"'
65
McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 800.
66411 U.S. at 800.
67Egbuna, 95 F.3d at 357.
" Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 889.

